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Action
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Control: 10,

Rec'd: November 1, 1962
1:35 a.m.

Info

FROM: New York

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1585, November 1, 1 a.m.

PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT PASS TO WHITE HOUSE

CUBA

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FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF SYG'S PRELIMINARY REPORT OF CUBAN VISIT GIVEN THIS EVENING TO STEVENSON, MCCLOY AND YOST AND ALREADY TELEPHONED TO SECRETARY.

AT FIRST MEETING YESTERDAY SYG FOUND CASTRO IN IMPOSSIBLE AND INTRACTABLE MOOD. HE WAS EXTREMELY BITTER AT SOVIETS, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE KHRUSHCHEV HAD NOT CONSULTED HIM BEFORE DESPATCHING HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT SUNDAY MORNING. CASTRO MADE HIS FIVE-POINT DECLARATION THREE HOURS LATER IN ORDER TO COMPLICATE SITUATION FOR SOVIETS. SYG FORESEES SHOWDOWN WHEN MIKOYAN ARRIVES. CASTRO DECLARED CATEGORICALLY THAT THERE COULD BE NO INSPECTION OF ANY KIND OR ANY OUTSIDE AGENCY ON CUBAN SOIL. IT WAS ALSO CLEAR THERE ARE NOT AND HAVE NOT BEEN ANY CUBANS ON MISSILE SITES FROM WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN RIGIDLY EXCLUDED. CASTRO SAID UN COULD INSPECT ON HIGH SEAS, BUT NOT IN CUBAN TERRITORY AND WAS FURIOUS WITH KHRUSHCHEV FOR MAKING VERIFICATION COMMITMENT AND MADE IT CLEAR HE WOULD NOT PERMIT EVEN INSPECTION OF WHAT IS LEFT BEHIND AFTER SITES DISMANTLED AND EVACUATED. HE WAS VERY STRONGLY OPPOSED TO AERIAL-RECONNAISSANCE, EVEN BY UN, AS VIOLATION CUBAN SOVEREIGNTY.

YESTERDAY SYG ASKED SOVIET AMB WHEN DISMANTLING STARTED AND HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE. AMB REPLIED HE WOULD SEEK ANSWERS FROM MILITARY. HE AND SOVIET GENERAL CALLED ON U THANT THIS AFTERNOON AND REPLIED AS FOLLOWS: INSTRUCTIONS WERE

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RECEIVED FROM KHRUSHCHEV BETWEEN 1 AND 3 PM ON SUNDAY AND DISMANTLING STARTED AT 3 PM. DISMANTLING WILL BE COMPLETED BY TOMORROW NIGHT OR AT LATEST BY FRIDAY. AT THAT TIME ALL EQUIPMENT WILL BE PACKED AND AT THE PORTS. ON FRIDAY SITES INCLUDING PADS WILL BE BULDOZED. THEY CLAIMED BASES ALREADY DO NOT EXIST. THEY HAVE ASKED FOR SHIPS AND SAID KUZNETSOV - WOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE SYG WITH SHIPPING SCHEDULES.

THERE WAS NO SPECIFIC MENTION OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT BUT SYG HAD IMPRESSION THAT THESE WERE ALSO BEING EVACUATED, PARTICULARLY SINCE THEY BELIEVE CUBANS ARE UNABLE TO FLY BEAGLES. IT WAS GENERAL RIKHYE'S BELIEF THAT ANY EQUIPMENT THAT THE SOVIETS MANNED WILL GO AS WELL AS ALL SOVIET MILITARY. HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER SAM ANTI-AIRCRAFT MANNED BY SOVIETS OR CUBANS ALTHOUGH CASTRO CLAIMS ALL ANTI-AIRCRAFT MANNED BY CUBANS AND THAT THEY SHOT DOWN U-2. RIKHYE PRESUMES THAT IF SAMs ARE MANNED BY CUBANS THEY WILL REMAIN.

REVERTING TO FIRST MEETING WITH CASTRO SYG SAID HE HAD BEEN TERRIBLY TENSE AND NERVOUS AND THAT HE (THANT) HAD NEVER HAD MORE TRYING ENCOUNTER IN ALL HIS EXPERIENCE. CASTRO HAD CONSTANTLY REPEATED US RADIO REPORTS THAT SYG HAD COME NOT TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS BUT TO INSPECT. THANT INTERRUPTED MEETING AFTER TWO AND ONE-QUARTER HOURS.

NEXT MORNING CASTRO, ACCOMPANIED BY DORTICOS AND ROA, WAS A LITTLE BETTER BUT STILL ADAMANT, INSISTING CUBANS WOULD FIGHT TO LAST MAN, THAT NO ONE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO INFRINGE THEIR SOVEREIGNTY, AND THAT IF SECURITY COUNCIL IS TO DISCUSS CUBAN PROBLEM IT MAY DO SO ONLY ON BASIS HIS FIVE POINTS. HE MADE CLEAR HE WAS READY FOR LONG-RANGE PROBLEMS INVOLVING CUBA TO BE DISCUSSED IN UN CONTEXT BUT NOT IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF INSPECTION.

ON OTHER HAND, HE WAS CONCILIATORY CONCERNING MAJOR ANDERSON, SAYING THAT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO RETURN HIM ALIVE IF HE WERE ALIVE BUT THAT HE WILL RETURN HIS BODY UNDER UN AUSPICES.

SYG EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT CONTINUATION US BLOCKADE IS NO LONGER NECESSARY. GENERAL RIKHYE WAS CONFIDENT SOVIETS WILL NOT BRING IN ANY MORE MISSILES. SOVIET MILITARY ARE FED UP AND WANT TO GET OUT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THERE IS, MOREOVER, NO SHORTAGE OF CONVENTIONAL HARDWARE - ARTILLERY, ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND MACHINE GUNS. WHAT IS NEEDED IN CUBA IS FOOD NOT HARDWARE. SYG EMPHASIZED PARTICULARLY

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INCREDIBLY BAD ECONOMIC SITUATION IN HAVANA. HE FELT CON-
TINUATION OF BLOCKADE WOULD SIMPLY MAKE CUBANS MORE DESPERATE
AND MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO CASTRO'S INFLUENCE.

THANT AND LOUTFI BOTH EXPRESSED STRONG CONVICTION THAT
ALL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND ALL SOVIET MILITARY WILL DEPART.
IN REPLY TO OUR INQUIRIES HE WAS UNABLE MAKE ANY SUGGESTION
IN REGARD TO VERIFICATION HE OBVIOUSLY, HOWEVER, HAD IN
MIND AT LEAST SOME US OVERFLIGHTS SINCE HE URGED WE NOT MAKE
ANY BEFORE FRIDAY WHEN DISMANTLING WILL PRESUMABLY BE COMPLETE.

NARASIMHAN INQUIRED WHETHER IT IS STILL OUR DESIRE THAT UN
PROCEED TO ORGANIZE RED CROSS INSPECTION AND WE INFORMED HIM
THAT IT IS. HE WAS INTERESTED TO KNOW HOW THIS WOULD BE
FINANCED.

STEVENSON

HC

Note: Passed White House, 11/1/62, 1:49 a.m., RNL

Advance copy to SS, SS-O and INR (TEM)

Relayed Principle Officers Executive Committee per SS-O

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